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ABSTRACT 
 
War and Endogenous Democracy*
 
Many episodes of extension of franchise in the 19th and especially in the 20th century 
occurred during or in the aftermath of major wars. Motivated by this fact, we offer a theory of 
political transitions which focuses on the impact of international conflicts on domestic political 
institutions. We argue that mass-armies, which appeared in Europe after the French 
Revolution, are an effective military organization only if the conscripted citizens are willing to 
put effort in fighting wars, which in turn depends on the economic incentives that are provided 
to them. The need to provide such incentives implies that an oligarchy adopting a mass-army 
may voluntarily decide to promise some amount of income redistribution to its citizens, 
conditionally on satisfactory performance as soldiers. When the elite cannot credibly commit 
to provide an incentive-compatible redistribution, they may cope with the moral hazard 
problem of the citizens-soldiers only by relinquishing political power to them through the 
extension of franchise. This is because democracy always implements a highly redistributive 
fiscal policy, which makes fighting hard incentive-compatible for the citizens-soldiers. We 
show that a transition to democracy is more likely to occur when the external threat faced by 
an incumbent oligarchy is in some sense intermediate. A very high external threat allows the 
elite to make credible commitments of future income redistribution in favor of the citizens, 
while a limited external threat makes optimal for the elite not making any (economic or 
political) concession to the masses. Some historical evidence consistent with our theory is 
also provided. 
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The basis of democratization is everywhere purely military in character... Military dis-
cipline meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was compelled
to secure the cooperation of the non-aristocratic masses and hence put arms, and along with
arms political power, into their hands.Max Weber (1950 pp. 325-326).
1 Introduction
The process of politico-economic development of the Western world has been marked, during
the 19th and 20th century, by two distinctive trends: the progressive extension of franchise
and consolidation of democratic institutions, and the increasing scal redistribution of income
promoted by the governments. According to the standard positive theory of taxation and
redistribution (e.g. Romer 1975, Roberts 1977, Meltzer and Richard 1981), these trends are
intimately related since the extension of franchise, by reducing the income of the median voter
relative to the mean income, should be expected to generate the political support for a more
redistributive scal policy. However, because higher taxation is detrimental to the interests
of the rich, the question of why an oligarchic government, representing the interests of the
economic elite, should ever extend franchise rights to the lower classes naturally suggests itself.
This paper attempts to provide an answer to the question of the rationale for the extension
of franchise in the Western world, which emphasizes the importance of international warfare for
the endogenous evolution of political institutions.1 Our theory is motivated by the observation
that many episodes of extension of voting rights and of consolidation of democracy occurred in
the West during, and more often in the aftermath, of the waging of major wars. For example
universal su¤rage, i.e. the provision of the right to vote with no qualication to the whole adult
male and female population, was rst introduced in Austria in 1918, in Belgium in 1948, in
Denmark in 1915, in France in 1946, in Germany in 1919, in Italy in 1946, in the Netherlands
in 1919, in Norway in 1915, and in Sweden in 1918.2 Canada, adopted universal su¤rage with
some voting qualications in 1920, and Finland did so in 1919. In the U.K., a large portion
of adult male population had been enfranchised by end of the 19th century, but some voting
qualications had been kept in place; these restrictions were eventually removed only in 1918.
The theory of democratic transitions proposed in this paper rests on two main factual
1From now on, we will use the expressions extension of franchise and concession of democracy inter-
changeably.
2 In some of these countries, universal male su¤rage was introduced sometime before universal su¤rage was.
For instance, universal male su¤rage was introduced in Belgium in 1919, in Italy in 1919 (when a number of
voting qualications contemplated by previous electoral law of 1911 were removed), and in the Netherlands in
1917. See also Therborn (1977 p. 11, table 2).
1
assumptions. The rst assumption is the existence of fragmentation and rivalry within a system
of states generating the threat of outbreak of military conicts. The second assumption, equally
important, is that of a widespread use of a military technology based on the deployment of
mass-armies. We argue that, under these conditions, an oligarchic government may voluntarily
decide to make economic or political concessions, i.e. to promise some income redistribution or
to concede a franchise extension, in order to provide to the citizens the incentives to undertake a
costly action ghting hard in battle which is benecial to the elite themselves. By credibly
promising some redistribution of income to the citizens, the elite can cope with the moral
hazard problem potentially arising when the citizens are conscripted in mass-armies. However,
because a war does not occur at any period of time, an incentive-compatible redistribution
may not be always credibly promised to the citizens, due to the incentive that the elite have
of reneging on past promises when a period of peace eventually comes. If a credible promise
of income redistribution cannot be made by the elite to the citizens, the only way the elite
may cope with the moral hazard problem of the citizens-soldiers is by relinquishing political
power through the extension of franchise. The extension of franchise may allow the elite to
commit to an incentive-compatible redistribution, since it involves a permanent reallocation
of political power to the citizens. On the other hand, because democracy implements a highly
redistributive scal policy, conceding it allows to cope with the moral hazard problem of the
citizens-soldiers.
In practice, radical changes in political institutions, such as a substantial extension of
franchise, are rarely observed in times of hostilities, arguably because of the fear that they
may exacerbate domestic political instability, and thus have highly undesirable negative e¤ects
on the ability to wage war successfully. Nonetheless, even if some constraint prevents the
concession of democracy in war times, we demonstrate that the promise of an extension of
franchise at the end of a war may itself provide to the elite some additional leeway to commit
to future redistribution. This is the case if the likelihood of occurrence of a war is potentially
variable over time and, in particular, it is relatively high in the aftermath of a war, and
lower after a protracted period of peace. If a new conict is expected to occur with relatively
high probability following the conclusion of a war, the elite may credibly promise during the
period of war to concede democracy at the end of the conict, because of the high expected
cost of breaking the promise of democratization. More precisely, we show that democracy
can be credibly promised in a period of war (when political institutions cannot be changed by
assumption), and then conceded in the period of peace immediately following, in a trigger-type
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). This equilibrium is supported by the (credible) threat of
2
the citizens of putting no e¤ort in ghting future wars, if the elite deviate from a promise of
democratization. We also show that the same reputational mechanism supporting the promise
of democracy, may not support a mere (intertemporal) promise of redistribution. This is
because the elite may prefer to deviate from the promise in question, once a transition to a
state of relative insulation from war (i.e. where the probability of outbreak of a new war in
the future is relatively small) eventually happens. It must be emphasized at this point that
focusing on a history-dependent SPE, rather than on a Markov perfect equilibrium, is essential
in our model since, in a Markovian equilibrium, it would never be optimal for the elite to fulll
the promise to extend franchise after the end of a war.3
We also show that a transition to democracy is more likely to occur when the threat posed
by war to the oligarchy in power, in terms of the income disruption caused by a military
defeat, is intermediate. A very high external threat increases the ability of the elite to make
credible commitments to the citizens, as it makes more costly for the elite to break a promise
of income redistribution. This makes the elite more likely to implement redistributive policies,
but not political reforms. A very limited external threat makes either economic and political
concessions too expensive for the elite relative to the expected cost of losing a war, and therefore
no concessions are made. Finally, an intermediate degree of external threat induces the elite
to prefer avoiding a military defeat, but does not enable them to make credible promises of
incentive-compatible redistribution. Hence, the extension of franchise is the strategy that the
elite can pursue in order to exploit the military potential of mass-army.
Two important qualications are worthwhile remarking. First, our theory makes only a
conditional statement regarding the relationship between warfare and democratization. Specif-
ically, our theory suggests that warfare may lead to democracy only when wars are waged
through mass-armies, based on the conscription of large parts of the population and in partic-
ular of the lower classes, rather than on professional militaries formed by volunteer soldiers.4
Second, while the focus of our paper is on the impact of mass warfare on the birth of modern
democracy and modern welfare state in the West, the core proposition of our theory, according
3The equilibrium concept adopted reects a crucial di¤erence between our model and other models of political
transitions such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 2006), who focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium
of a dynamic political game. Because in their setup democracy can be conceded at any point in time, nothing
substantial is lost by neglecting other SPEs. Conversely, because in our model democracy can only be promised
in periods of wars, reputational factors are crucial in supporting an equilibrium with democratization.
4For example, Downing (1992) argues that the international warfare mounting among European nations
at the beginning of the Modern Era, had the e¤ect of wiping out the parliamentary institutions existing in
Continental Europe which, as he claims, contained the seeds of modern representative democracy. This view is
not in contradiction with our theory, as the military technology adopted in the West all through the Modern
Era was based on the deployment of professional militaries, rather than on mass-armies as we assume.
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to which political and social rights are the counterpart of military duties, has potentially a much
wider scope. In fact, a causal relation between changes in the military organization determin-
ing an extension of military duties to broader portions of society, and a politico-institutional
evolution toward more inclusive forms of government, can be observed in the history of the
Western, and non-Western, world, well before the 19th century.5
Our model sheds some new light on many important cases of democratic transitions oc-
curred in Western countries during the last two centuries. In particular, we can explain the
divergent evolution of political institutions in Prussia/Germany, which developed a welfare
state but did not democratize, with respect to countries such as England and the U.S., which
all experienced a progressive extension of voting rights, culminated in universal su¤rage. We
also argue that the concession of the right to vote to women in the rst half of the 20th cen-
tury, can be interpreted as the counterpart of their participation to the waging of total wars,
for instance by substituting the men at the front in factories and other productive activities.
Finally, we can provide a rationale of why democracy failed to consolidate in geographic areas,
such as Latin America and Africa, which have been largely insulated from the episodes of mass
warfare experienced by Europe and by the U.S. during the 20th century.
The existence of a link between mass warfare and the extension of political rights, simi-
lar to the one suggested by our theory, has been widely recognized by political scientists and
historians, including among others Weber (1950), Titmuss (1958), Andreski (1968), Marwick
(1974), Therborn (1977), Giddens (1987), Mann (1988), Hobsbawm (1990), Porter (1994),
Keyssar (2000), Dolman (2004) and Halperin (2004).6 However, none of these authors clearly
species a casual mechanism linking war and democratization, nor emphasizes the importance
of democracy for the credible provision of incentives to citizens-soldiers, which is a distinc-
tive feature of our theory. Also, none of the works cited above claries why the promise of
democracy made to the masses in war times is often fullled by the elite once the war, and the
related threat faced by the elite, has ended. Finally, none of the authors mentioned explains
the distinction between mere promises of income redistribution and the promise to concede
5A signicant example is provided by the history of Athens in the age of Solon and Pericles (6th and 5th
century BC), when the citizenship rights were substantially extended to the lower classes in order to cope with
the increasing need of military manpower for both the army (the hoplite phalanx) and the navy (e.g. Beukema,
1941, Dolman, 2004). Andreski (1968) discusses several other cases of expansion of political and social citizenship
rights triggered by changes in the military technology toward the model of mass-army, such as China during
the warring kingdomsperiod (480 to 221 BC) century, or the Roman Republic during the sixth century.
6Other scholars such as Hintze (1975), Tilly (1975, 1990), Skocpol (1979) and Kennedy (1987), also remark
the importance of warfare as determinant of political development, but focus on other forms of institutional
change, e.g. the expansion of state capacity (see Besley and Persson, 2007, for a recent investigation of this
issue).
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democracy, which is instead addressed by our theory.
Our theory is closely related to a recent literature in political economy, which investigates
the reasons why countries democratize, and more generally experience transitions across dif-
ferent political regimes and institutions. This literatures includes a number of contributions
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 2006), who argue that the elite may transfer
the political power to the masses in order to make a credible commitment to future income
redistribution, which allows the prevention of social unrest and revolutions. A somehow sim-
ilar explanation can be found in Conley and Temimi (2001). Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and
Llavador and Oxoby (2005) o¤er another type of rationale for the extension of the franchise,
based on an intra-elite conict between landlords and commercial classes, rather than on a
threat of revolution posed to the elite by the poor. Boix (2003) emphasizes the importance of
economic fundamentals, such as asset specicity and income inequality, for the transition to
democracy. Jack and Laguno¤ (2006) and Gradstein (2007) propose models where the exten-
sion of franchise allows the current pivotal decision maker voter to make credible commitments
to future policy choices. Glaeser (2006) and Jackson and Morelli (2007) address the question,
specular to the one that motivates our paper, of how political regimes a¤ect the incentives of
incumbent governments to wage war, while Greif (2006) argues that internal rivalries within
a polity may favor the endogenous emergence of political institutions suitable to regulate and
prevent the outbreak of potential domestic conicts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. In Section 3, we
dene the equilibrium concept adopted and characterize the equilibrium of the model. Section
4 presents some historical evidence illustrating the causal mechanism driving democratization
which our theory identies. Section 5 concludes. Section 6 contains the proofs not reported in
the text.
2 The Basic Environment
We consider an economy in discrete time, populated by a continuum of measure 1 of innitely
lived agents. All agents have the same risk-neutral preferences described by
E0
1X
t=0
t (cj;t   ej;t) ;
where E0 is the expected value operator at time t = 0,  2 (0; 1) is the common discount factor,
cj;t is the consumption of a private good of individual j (which is always equal to disposable
income), and ej;t is equal to one if individual j undertakes at time t an activity described below
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involving the utility cost  > 0, and equal to zero vice versa.
Agents di¤er in terms of their productivity or skills level, that can be high or low. The
high-skill agents, forming a continuum of measure n < 1=2, have a pre-tax income equal to
AH ; the low-skill agents are a continuum of measure 1 n and have a pre-tax income equal to
AL < AH . Because the high-skill agents are initially in control of the political system, we also
refer to them as the elite, and to low-skill agents as the citizens. Moreover, we denote with H
and L respectively, the set of high-skill and the set of low-skill agents.
The economy and the agents are part of a country which, at any point in time, can be
either in war or in peace with an external enemy, as denoted by the state variable t. When
t = 
w, the country is involved in a war at time t; when instead t 2 fu; pg, the country
is in peace, but it faces either one of two di¤erent levels of future external threat. In state
t = 
u (that we dene as unstable peace), a war occurs in the following period with a
relatively high probability, qu 2 (0; 1), and in state t = p (stable peace), a war occurs in
the following period with a relatively small probability, qp 2 [0; qu]. Furthermore, we assume
that the state u obtains only after a period of war, and with probability one. More formally,
the stochastic process governing the evolution of  is such that: Pr

t+1 = 
w jpt
	  qp,
Pr

t+1 = 
p jpt
	  1   qp, Prt+1 = w jut 	  qu, Prt+1 = p jut 	 = 1   qu, and
Pr

t+1 = 
u jwt
	
= 1.
If a war occurs, the country wins it with probability Pt, which is endogenously determined
in the equilibrium of the model. In particular, Pt depends positively on the overall e¤ort put
by the citizens in ghting wars, reecting the fact that the military technology adopted is
based on the deployment of a mass-army, i.e. of a military organization that relies heavily on
conscription and war e¤ort of a large number of citizens-soldiers.7 To simplify the analysis, we
assume that all and only the citizens join the army in periods of war, and that Pt 2 f0; 1g, i.e.
a war is either won or lost with probability one. In particular, we assume that Pt = 1 if the
number of citizens who put the required e¤ort in ghting (as explained below), is larger than
some threshold   1   n, and Pt = 0 otherwise.8 If a war is ever lost, the external enemy
permanently takes the country over from the following period, and all agents receive a constant
payo¤ equal to a fraction (1  ) of the output they produce from then on. The exogenous
parameter  2 (0; 1), i.e. the share of income permanently lost in favor of the enemy in case
7The concept of military e¤ortshould here be understood in a broad sense, including obviously the e¤ort
put by the soldiers on the battleeld, but also the e¤ort put by the women mobilized to serve in the home front,
e.g. substituting the conscripted men in factory jobs and in other tasks.
8Given that all poor are identical, in equilibrium either all or none of them will put e¤ort, so that the
particular value of  is irrelevant.
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of defeat, captures the extent of the external threat faced.
Putting e¤ort in ghting entails a utility cost  equal for all citizens, but the corresponding
individual decision is imperfectly observable to the state; specically, shirking is detected
with probability  < 1. This generates a moral hazard problem, whereby citizens-soldiers can
be induced to put e¤ort only if they are paid some informational rent, i.e. receive some benet
in excess of the e¤ort cost , which is potentially lost in case of detected misbehavior. In
particular, we assume that if a citizen-soldier is caught shirking at period t, he is permanently
excluded from any scal redistribution provided by the government since period t + 1.9 The
individual e¤ort decision at time t of citizen j is denoted as ej;t 2 f0; 1g.
The government in o¢ ce can tax and redistribute income. The instrument available to
raise taxes is proportional taxation at rate  t, and the revenues collected are rebated with a
uniform scal transfer Tt. This scal transfer is provided to all and only the agents who have
never been caught shirking up to period t, and we assume that, if an agent is caught shirking
at period t or before, his transfer is thrown away by the government.10 The government budget
needs to be always balanced, and this implies that
Tt   ty; (1)
where y = (1  n)AL + nAH denotes the aggregate (and average) level of output. At any
period t such that the country has never been defeated in a war, the post-tax income of an
individual j is equal to
ajt = (1   t)AH + Tt; (2)
if j 2 H, and equal to
ajt = (1   t)AL + Tt; (3)
if j 2 L and he has not been caught shirking up to period t included. Finally, if j 2 L, and
the individual has been caught shirking before period t; his net income at period t is equal to
a^jt = (1   t)AL. (4)
We assume that taxation generates no distortions as long as  is smaller than some threshold
^ 2 (0; 1), and there are exceedingly large distortions if  is set anywhere above ^ . This implies
that the set of feasible taxes is [0; ^ ].
9As explained in more details below, this comes from the fact that scal policy is implemented before citizens
make their e¤ort decision.
10This assumption is unimportant since all citizens always put e¤ort in ghting in any equilibrium where
some income is redistributed.
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We consider a dynamic political game involving the elite and the citizens, who make their
decisions facing the threat posed by an external enemy. Given the policy instrument specied
below, there is no conict of interest within the elite, and within the two subgroups in with the
low-skill agents may potentially be divided, i.e. those who have never been caught shirking,
and those who have been caught shirking. Therefore, we can assume that, if any group has
political power, the relevant political decisions made in each period reect the preferences of the
representative agent of that group. In each period of war, the citizens also make individually
an economic choice, i.e. whether to put e¤ort or not in ghting, after the government has made
all relevant political decisions for that period. Moreover, in making their e¤ort decision, the
citizens behave competitively, in the sense that each of them assumes that his action a¤ects
neither future government policies nor the e¤ort decisions of other agents.11
The game considered has two types of state variables. In particular, there are two aggregate
state variables st 2 S  fN;D;Cg and t 2   fw; p; ug, denoting respectively the
political regime in place at the beginning of period t, and whether the country is in war or in
peace (which may be stable or unstable) at the same time, and an individual state variable
zj;t 1 2 f0; 1g, with zj;t 1 = 0 denoting a citizen j that has never been caught shirking up to
period t 1, and vice versa. The political regime of the country at the beginning in period t can
be an oligarchy (st = N), where the elite have all political power, a democracy (st = D), where
a leader (the representative member of one the existing social groups) is elected by majority
voting and implements his preferred policy,12 or the regime that emerges after a military
defeat (st = C), where neither the elite nor the citizens have any power and the corresponding
above-described policy is implemented forever. Since the political state at period t may change
endogenously, we let s0t denote the political state obtaining if there is a regime transition at
t, which is also equal to the political state st+1 obtaining at the beginning of period t + 1.
Finally, the long run (endogenous) political regime of the model will be denoted by s1.
All political decisions in each period t are taken at the beginning of the period, after
observing the realization of t, and before the citizens make their e¤ort decision when t = 
w.
11The political game that we consider has many feature in common with the framework proposed by Chari
and Kehoe (1990). They study a model where a benevolent government chooses policy sequentially in presence
of a large number of agents. While individuals behave competitively, the government is strategic in that it
takes into account the consequence of its actions on the future decisions of private agents. In this setup, Chari
and Kehoe prove the existence of trigger-type equilibria based on a reputational mechanism similar to the one
operating in our model.
12The assumptions made on the democratic political process could be given a microfoundation assuming
a citizen-candidate type of model of electoral competition. In practice, because in equilibrium one group (the
citizens who have never been caught shirking) will always make up for more than 50% of the voters in democracy,
the particular way the political process is modelled is unimportant.
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The policy decisions include the tax rate  t 2 [0; 1], the level of the scal transfer Tt  0, and
the decisions to promise or not and to concede or not democracy, denoted respectively by
t 2 f0; 1g and  t 2 f0; 1g. Moreover, in state w no political transitions are possible by
assumption, and therefore only the promise to concede democracy in the following period
(unstable peace) can be made. In particular, if the oligarchy chooses t 1 = 1 and  t = 1
(i.e. the elite promise democracy at period t  1, and implements the promise at period t), a
transition to democracy occurs at the beginning of period t and becomes immediately e¤ective.
If the elite give up political power by conceding democracy at some point, it has no chance of
getting it back (e.g. by organizing a military coup against democracy).
Unlike the citizens, who have pre-tax income below average and may gain from some scal
redistribution of income nanced with linear taxation (see Section 3.2), the elite are armed
by taxation per se. Nonetheless, even an oligarchy may want to commit to implement some
income redistribution in order to provide to the citizens the incentive to ght hard in war times,
thus preventing a military defeat and the consequent income loss. Because the external threat
is not always present, the elite may not be able to commit to a su¢ ciently large intertemporal
income redistribution, due to the incentive of deviating from such a promise in peace times.
This incentive is clearly potentially stronger in the state of stable peace s, as the likelihood of
occurrence of a war in the future is lower than in state u, and therefore the punishment of a
deviation is expected to be less severe. If this is the case, the only way the elite may be able to
provide the due incentives to the citizens-soldiers to ght well in a war, is to promise to concede
democracy at the end of the war. Conceding democracy is a form of credible commitment to
future redistribution since it involves a permanent reallocation of political power to the citizens.
Moreover, because a transition to democracy can happen in the following a period of war, i.e.
in a state of unstable peace where the country faces a relatively serious potential external
threat, the promise to conceding democracy needs to be ex post optimal for the elite in state
u only.
Summarizing, the sequence of events taking place within the stage-game is the following.
1. The realization of the state variable t is publicly revealed.
2. If st = N and t 6= w, the oligarchy chooses  t. If  t = 0, then s0t = st+1 = N , and if
 t = 1, then s
0
t = st+1 = D.
3. If st = N , the oligarchy chooses t and a scal policy vector

Nt ; T
N
t
	
. If st = D,
democracy chooses a scal policy vector

Dt ; T
D
t
	
.
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4. If t = 
p, the scal policy announced by the government at the beginning of period t is
implemented.
5. If t = 
w, then:
a) Each citizen j decides his war e¤ort level ej;t, the war is fought and its outcome is
publicly revealed.
b) The scal policy announced by the government at the beginning of period t is imple-
mented, and a fraction  of the citizens-soldiers with zj;t 1 = 1, choosing ej;t = 0,
are detected.
c) If the war is won the government remains in power and st+1 = st. If the war is lost,
the country is taken over permanently by the external enemy and st+r = C for all
r  1.
Finally, we assume that the society starts with an oligarchic political regime, i.e. s0 = N .
3 Denition of the Equilibrium
The history of the game includes both individual and aggregate outcomes. Individual outcomes
potentially include the list of all past e¤ort decisions of a citizen, and whether a citizen has
ever been caught shirking or not in the past. In practice, the only relevant information of each
citizens history is whether or not he has been ever caught shirking, i.e. zj;t 1 2 f0; 1g. The
aggregate outcomes include the list of all past political decisions (i.e. the levels of taxes and
transfers), which is observed by all agents. We denote with ht the aggregate politicalhistory
of the game up to time t, and with Ht the set of all such histories.
Strategies assign actions for any history in Ht  f0; 1g. A strategy prole the players in
the game can be represented by a mapping13
 : Ht  f0; 1g ! f0; 1g  [0; 1] R2+  f0; 1g2 ; (5)
where the range of the strategy proles again refers to the individual e¤ort decision ej;t 2 f0; 1g
when j 2 L, and to the choice of the tax rate  t 2 [0; 1], of the level of the scal transfer Tt 2 R+,
13The government in o¢ ce, unlike individual citizens, also observes which citizens have been ever caught
shirking. However, it turns out that this information does not a¤ect the strategy of the government. The reason
is that, if a set of zero measure of citizens deviates, this has no e¤ect on the strategy of the government by the
competitive assumption. If instead a set of positive measure of citizens deviates, a transition to state C obtains
in the period that follows. Because state C is absorbing, we do not need to specify how any government plays
after any history where a transition to C has occurred.
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and to the decision of whether promise democracy, t 2 f0; 1g, and to concede democracy,
 t 2 f0; 1g, when j is the leader making political decisions. A strategy prole  is a subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it is a best response to itself for all
 
ht; zj;t 1
 2 Ht  f0; 1g (i.e.,
if it is sequentially rational).14
In the following, rather than o¤ering a complete characterization of the set of the SPEs of
the game, which is potentially very large, we will focus the attention on the equilibrium that
is best for the elite, i.e. where the elites value (namely the present discounted value of their
payo¤s) is maximized. In the SPE in question, the elite are able to induce the citizens to ght
hard while retaining political power for the largest possible set of parameters values, and thus
the scope for wars to induce democratic transitions is as limited as possible.
As already explained, we do not restrict strategies to be Markovian (i.e. to depend on pay-
o¤ relevant information only). This is because in a Markovian subgame perfect equilibrium, it
would never be optimal for the elite to concede democracy in peace times, and political insti-
tutions cannot be changed in war times by assumption in our model. As a result, a transition
to democracy would never occur in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Vice versa, in our model
a transition to democracy can occur since players follow history-dependent strategies, which
may allow the elite to make, in a period of war, the credible promise to concede democracy in
the following period of peace.
3.1 The E¤ort Decision of the Citizens
In this subsection, we begin the analysis of the political game by analyzing the e¤ort decision
of the citizens. In particular, we seek to characterize the incentive-compatibility constraint
that needs to be satised in order to induce each citizen to put e¤ort in ghting wars.
Consider the subgame played after any history ht 1 such that st 2 fR;Dg, i.e. a military
defeat has never occurred. If t = 
w and zj;t 1 = 0 (i.e. if citizen j has never been caught
shirking up to period t  1), sequential rationality implies that citizen j chooses ej;t = 1 rather
than ej;t = 0 provided that
V L (st; 
w jej;t = 1)  V L (st; w jej;t = 0) . (6)
The left-hand-side of this inequality, V L (st; w jej;t = 1), is the value of citizen j corresponding
to ej;t = 1. Under the assumption that Pt = 1 (i.e. a continuum of citizens larger or equal
14We will often refer to subcomponents of  rather than the entire strategy prole and, when there is no risk
of confusion, and we will use the index j to denote individuals or groups interchangeably.
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than  chooses to put e¤ort in ghting at period t), this value satises the following recursion
V L (st; 
w jej;t = 1) = (1   t)AH + Tt    + V L (st+1; u) : (7)
This expression decomposes the value in question into the ow payo¤, which includes the
post-tax and transfer income of citizen j net of the utility cost of e¤ort , and the discounted
continuation value V L (st+1; u). The latter value reects the fact that in the equilibrium
under consideration Pt = 1, and this implies that st and st+1 are both di¤erent from C. This
value also takes into account that periods of war are followed by periods of unstable peace. In
particular, the values of citizen j in state (st; u) and (st; p) are respectively
V L (st; 
u) = (1   t)AH + Tt + 

quV L (st+1; 
w) + (1  qu)V L (st+1; p)

; (8)
and
V L (st; 
p) = (1   t)AH + Tt + 

qpV L (st+1; 
w) + (1  qp)V L (st+1; p)

: (9)
Equations (7), (8) and (9) represents the system of recursions satised by the values of citizen
j in the three possible states of the world, under the hypotheses stated above.
If instead citizen j chooses ej;t = 0, his value is equal to
V L (st; 
w jej;t = 0) = (1   t)AH + Tt + 
h
(1  )V L (st+1; u) + V^ L (st+1; u)
i
: (10)
The rst term in the recursion (10) is the ow payo¤ of agent j if ej;t = 0, and reects the fact
that the agent savesthe e¤ort cost  but loses the scal transfers granted since period t+1 if
caught shirking, which happens with probability . The second term in square brackets is the
continuation value of j, and it also reects the fact that, with probability  the shirking of agent
j at period t is detected, in which case zj;t = 1 and he gets a value V^ L (st+1; u), characterized
below, since period t+ 1. Note also that the notation used accounts for the possibility that a
political transition may occur between period t and period t+ 1, i.e. st 6= st+1.
Because a citizen caught shirking will never put e¤ort in ghting wars (since putting e¤ort
would only entail the utility cost  at no gain), the value V^ L (st+1; u) can be decomposed
as the discounted sum of the stream of future post-tax incomes of the agent beginning since
period t+ 1, or
V^ L (st+1; 
u) =
1X
v=1
v 1
 
1  t+v

AL

: (11)
In this expression, t+v denotes the wedge between the income produced and consumed by an
agent j with zj;t+v 1 = 1, and which is equal to  t+v if st+v 2 fD;Ng and to  if st+v = C.
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Using (7) and (10), constraint (6) can be written in the more explicit form15

h
V L (st+1; 
u)  V^ L (st+1; u)
i
 : (12)
If the incentive-compatibility constraint (12) is satised, the best response of citizen j to any
strategy prole such that Pt = 1 is to choose ej;t = 1. The model has yet potentially another
equilibrium where a coordination failureoccurs, as a result of the fact that no citizen chooses
to put e¤ort, if he expects any other citizen to do the same thing (and where Pt = 0 as a result).
However, because we are restricting the attention to the best SPE for the elite, in the following
we will neglect the equilibrium featuring this kind of coordination failure, and assume that if
constraint (12) is satised, then the equilibrium where all citizens choose ej;t = 1 obtains.16
In the following we will also assume (without making explicit restrictions) that the para-
meters of the model are such that condition (12) is satised if Tt+v = ^ y for each v  1, i.e.
when the maximum possible scal transfer is granted at each period of time by the government
in power.17
3.2 Values in Democracy
In this section, we characterize the SPE of the subgames beginning with democracy in power
(st = D). As explained before, decisions in democracy are made by majority voting. Because
the citizens who are detected shirking in war times lose forever any scal transfer conceded by
the government, there are potentially three distinct social groups, i.e. the elite, and the citizens
who have and who have not ever been caught shirking respectively. This makes the charac-
terization of the political equilibrium under majority voting potentially non trivial. However,
it will be true in equilibrium that if st = D, then L^t = ?, where L^t denotes the set of low-
skill agents who have ever been caught shirking before period t.18 The following proposition
characterizes the SPE of a subgame beginning in democracy.
Proposition 1 The unique SPE of all subgames starting with st = D, and L^t = ? involves 
 t  D = ^ ; Tt  TD = ^Y

and ej;t = 1 for each date t and for each j 2 L. Moreover,
Pt = 1 for any date t such that t = 
w, and democracy is an endogenously absorbing state.
15Note that the scal transfer Tt does not appear in (12), since it is provided to agent j before he makes his
e¤ort decison. Since agent j obtains Tt irrespectively on his choice of e¤ort level, Tt has no inuence on his
decision.
16 In practice, the potential coordination failure in question could be overcome due to the actions of leaders,
political parties, and other organizations pursuing the collective interests of the citizens.
17 It was not the case, then no scope for political or economic concessions would exist, and the models unique
equilibrium would involve a transition to state C after the rst period of war.
18 Intuitively, democracy is conceded by the elite precisely to induce the citizens to put e¤ort in ghting wars.
Moreover, since all citizens are ex ante equal, they all make the same e¤ort decision in equilibrium. This implies
that, if democracy is ever conceded, all citizens always choose to put e¤ort in ghting wars.
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Proof. Suppose rst that t 6= w. Because democracy persists until a military defeat
occurs, the continuation value of an agent since period t + 1 is not inuenced by the policy
chosen at period t. It follows that the scal policy chosen by the representative agent, assuming
that L^t = ?, is the policy maximizing his per period utility, namely the solution of the following
program
uL (D)  max
2[0;^ ];T2R+
(1  )AL + T (13)
subject to T  Y:
Clearly, the government budget constraint must always be binding. Otherwise, it would be
possible to increase uL (D) either by reducing  or by increasing T . Substituting T = Y into
the objective function of the program yields a function which is strictly increasing in  , and
thus maximized at  = ^ .
Suppose now that t = 
w. If the scal policy involving  = ^ and T = ^Y is implemented
also in state w, all citizens-soldiers j 2 L choose ej;t = 1, which ensures that Pt = 1. This
clearly gives the citizens a value strictly greater than the value that they can get by choosing
a scal policy with  t < ^ , that either leads to Pt = 0 (since ej;t = 0), and gives the citizens a
per period payo¤ of (1  )AL forever, or also leads to Pt = 1, but fails to maximize their per
period utility.
3.3 Values in Oligarchy
In this subsection, we consider the subgames beginning in state N (oligarchic political regime),
and characterize the payo¤s of the elite depending on the di¤erent possible strategies that the
oligarchy can follow. When in power in the state of war w, the oligarchy has three strategies
to choose from:
1. Make no political or economic concession to the citizens (i.e., no action,or NA).
2. Promise to the citizens to concede democracy after a war (i.e., democratization,or D).
3. Promise to the citizens some incentive-compatible intertemporal redistribution of income
only (i.e., redistribution,or R).
The rst possible strategy of the elite, no-action (NA), involves no promise of concessions
to the citizens and leads to a permanent transition to the absorbing state C after one period.
Since in state C all agents consume only the fraction (1  ) of their income that is not
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conscated, the value that the elite obtain in state w, when they choose NA, is equal to sum
of their full per period income, plus the present discounted value of their net future income, or
V H (N;w jno action) = AH +  (1  )A
H
1   . (14)
Next, we can compute the value of the elite when they promise in state w to concede
democracy in the forthcoming state u. Using equation (2) and Proposition 1, we have that
the value of the elite beginning in state st = D reads
V H (D) =
(1  ^)AH + ^Y
1   . (15)
Because the concession of democracy leads immediately to a political transition, (15) also
expresses the value of the elite when they concede democracy in state u. Finally, the value
of the elite, beginning in state w, when they credibly promise to concede democracy in the
following period reads
V H (N;w jdemocracy) = AH +  (1  ^)A
H + ^Y
1   . (16)
This expression reects the fact that if D is chosen in state w, the current war is won with
probability one because the citizens put e¤ort, and the elite retain their full income today, but
a permanent transition to democracy (with the corresponding scal policy outcome) follows
from tomorrow.
The promise made in war time to concede democracy after the end of the war is credible
only if conceding democracy is optimal for the elite in the subgame beginning in state u, which
depends on how the citizens will react to a deviation of the elite from the promise of democracy.
We assume that citizens inict on the elite the worst possible (credible) punishment, consisting
in not putting e¤ort in the next war (i.e., ej;t = 0 for all j), after observing any public history
ht 1 6= h^t 1, where h^t 1 is the equilibrium history induced by the strategy D. This implies
that a deviation from strategy D triggers a permanent transition to state C as soon as state w
obtains. This in turn implies that the best strategy for the elite after any history ht 1 6= h^t 1
is clearly to set  t = 0.
The values for the elite of a deviation from a promise of democracy in state u; p and
w dened respectively as ~V H (N;u), ~V H (N;p) and ~V H (N;w), can be computed as the
solution of the following system of recursive equations
~V H (N;u) = AH + 
h
qu ~V H (N;w) + (1  qu) ~V H (N;p)
i
; (17)
~V H (N;p) = AH + 
h
qp ~V H (N;w) + (1  qp) ~V H (N;p)
i
; (18)
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and
~V H (N;w) = AH + 
(1  )AH
1   : (19)
These expressions reect the fact that the most protable deviation for the elite involves setting
taxes equal to zero in any state of the world, so the elite retain their full income as long as s
6= C.
Remark 1 It can be veried that ~V H (N;w) < ~V H (N;u) < ~V H (N;p). This result is
intuitive since the ow payo¤ of the elite in state u and p is equal to AH whereas the
ow payo¤ of the elite in state w is equal to AH for one period and permanently equal to
(1  )AH since the following period. Hence, the value of the elite is the lowest in state w.
Furthermore, the punishment of a deviation in a period of unstable peace is expected to come
sooner than in stable peace (since qu > qs), which implies that ~V H (N;u) < ~V H (N;p).
By the one-stage deviation principle (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), a necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for subgame perfection is that the value of conceding democracy in state u
for the elite is larger than the value of deviating from the corresponding promise, given the
strategy of the citizens and the subsequent strategy of the elite. This leads to the following
no-deviation condition of the elite from the war time promise to concede democracy after the
end of the war
V H (D)  ~V H (N;u) ; (20)
where V H (D) and ~V H (N;u) are dened respectively by (15) and recursively by (17), (18)
and (19).
Lemma 1 9  =  2 (0; 1] such that the promise made in state w to concede democracy in
the subsequent state u is credible if and only if   .
Proof. We begin by observing that the system of recursions (17), (18) and (19), satised
by the values for the elite of a deviation from a promise of conceding democracy in state u,
p and w has solution19
~V H (N;u) = AH +

1  

qu (1  ) + (1  qu) 1   + q
p (1  )
1   (1  qp)

AH ; (21)
~V H (N;p) =
(1  )AH + qp (1  )AH
(1  ) [1   (1  qp)] ; (22)
19 It is straightforward to verify that ~V H (N;w) < ~V H (N;u) < ~V H (N;p), as pointed in Remark 1.
16
~V H (N;w) = AH + 
(1  )AH
1   : (23)
The strategy D, i.e. setting t = 1 and  t+1 = 1 if t = w, is credible for the elite if condition
(20) holds. This condition can be expressed in terms of the parameter . From (21), it is clear
that ~V H (N;u) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of , so that we denote it as
~V H (N;u j), and such that ~V H (N;u j = 0) = AH= (1  ) > V H (D). By Proposition
1, V H (D) does not depend on  (since the transition to democracy is su¢ cient to prevent a
military defeat at any future period). It follows that the equation
~V H (N;u j) = V H (D) ; (24)
has at most one solution over the interval (0; 1), and we dene  as the value of  that
satises this equation. If equation (24) has no solution in (0; 1), i.e. ~V H (N;u j) > V H (D)
for all possible values of , this means that democracy can never be credibly promised and we
conventionally set  = 1, as stated in the main text, and we conventionally set  = 1.
Lemma 1 shows that democracy can be credibly promised only if the cost of a military
defeat, parametrized by , is su¢ ciently large. For future reference, it is useful to point out
that the threshold  does not depend on  as this parameter does not appear on either
side of equation (24). Moreover, from Lemma 1 and from the ranking of the deviation payo¤s
established in Remark 1, it follows that the elite prefer the strategy democracyto the strategy
no-action,whenever the former is feasible. This is states and proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If   , strategy D is both feasible and gives the elite a higher equilibrium value
than strategy NA.
Proof. We need to show that V H (N;w jdemocracy) > V H (N;w jno action) when
   and, therefore, strategy D is feasible. This comes from the following facts: a)
V H (N;w jdemocracy) > V H (D) from the comparison of (15) and (16); b) V H (D)  ~V H (N;u)
when    from Lemma 1; c) ~V H (N;u) > ~V H (N;w) from Remark 1; d) ~V H (N;w) =
V H (N;w jno action) from (23) and (14).
The last possible strategy of the elite consists in credibly promising a su¢ ciently generous
income redistribution to the citizens that satises their incentive-compatibility constraint (12).
To characterize strategy R, we rst write down the system of recursions satised by the values
of the elite when they commit to an incentive-compatible redistribution in every possible state
i 2   fw; u; pg.
Dening (u; T u), (p; T p) and (w; Tw) as the vectors of taxes and transfers applying in the
corresponding stationary SPE in periods of unstable peace, stable peace and war respectively,
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the values of the elite in these states can be characterized as the solution of the following
system of recursive equations
V H (N;u) = (1  u)AH + T u +  quV H (N;w) + (1  qu)V H (N;p) ; (25)
V H (N;p) = (1  p)AH + T p +  qpV H (N;w) + (1  qp)V H (N;p) ; (26)
V H (N;w) = (1  w)AH + Tw + V H (N;u) ; (27)
where we have decomposed the values of the elite in oligarchy in the three possible states of
the world into the ow payo¤ and the discounted expected continuation value.
We use the one-stage deviation principle (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) to determine under
what conditions no protable deviations exist for the elite from the SPE with income redistri-
bution (strategy R). The value of the elite from a deviation depends naturally on the response
of the citizens. The most severe credible punishment that a citizen can inict on the elite
consists in the threat of not putting e¤ort in war in the future. This strategy implies that a
military defeat (i.e., P = 0) obtains as soon as a state of war occurs, leading immediately to
the absorbing state where all agents retain and consume only a fraction (1  ) of their earn-
ings forever. Thus, we suppose that each citizen chooses not to put e¤ort again (i.e. chooses
ej;t = 0), after observing any public history ht 1 6= ~ht 1, where ~ht 1 is the equilibrium history
induced by the strategy R. Taking the response of the citizens into account, the most prof-
itable deviation for the elite involves implementing their ideal scal policy
 
N = 0

after any
history ht 1 6= ~ht 1.
It follows that the value of the elite in state i 2  after a deviation from a promise of
redistribution is equal to their value in the same state after a deviation from a promise of
democratization, ~V H
 
N;i

, expressed by the solution of the system of recursions (17), (18)
and (19). Thus, the three no-deviation conditions of the elite applying in a SPE where the
elite choose strategy R can be written compactly as
V H
 
N;i
  ~V H  N;i ; (28)
for every i 2 .
We can now characterize the value of the elite in the subgame perfect equilibrium with
redistribution that is best for the elite itself, beginning in the rst period where a state of
war occurs. In equilibrium, the elite commits to the vector of taxes [w; u; p] subject to the
constraint of providing the due incentives to the citizens. Let T  inf ft : t = wg denote
the rst period of time when a state of war occurs. Because citizen-soldiers who are caught
18
shirking at a point in time lose forever any scal transfer provided from the following period,
the scal transfer provided in period T by the elite does not inuence the e¤ort decision of the
citizens-soldiers in T . Hence, the elite optimally set taxes at zero in period T and commit to
implement in the future the three state-dependent taxes solving the following program
V H (N;w jredistribution) = max
w;u;p
AH + V H (N;u; [w; u; p]) ; (29)
subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint of the citizen-soldiers (12), and to the three
no-deviation conditions of the elite applying in the three possible states of the world, expressed
by (28) for every i 2 . Expression (29) reects the fact that the elite retain their full income
in T and commit to a stationary vector of taxes since period T + 1.
If the constraint set dened by the four inequalities (12) and (28) for every i 2 , is not
empty, then program (29) has solution, and vice versa.20 If program (29) has no solution, the
only way the elite may have of credibly providing to the citizens the incentive to ght hard is
to promise democracy, which according to Lemma 1, is possible if and only if   .21
The next lemma (Lemma 3) will demonstrate that whether program (29) has solution or not
also depends on . To state Lemma 3, we need rst to introduce some preliminary denitions.
Let ~p () and p () be dened respectively as the minimum tax rate such that the
incentive-compatibility constraint of the citizens-soldiers (12) holds in state p, and the max-
imum tax rate that the elite can credibly promise to the citizens in state p, when taxes are
set in state u and w at level w = u = ^ .22 The notation used emphasize that these taxes
depend respectively on the cost of e¤ort  and of the cost of a military defeat . Moreover,
the tax rate ~p () does not depend on the parameter , capturing the permanent income
loss caused by a military defeat. This is again because of the competitive assumption, which
implies the e¤ort decision of a single individual, has a negligible impact on Pt and therefore
is not a¤ected by . Similarly, the tax rate p () does not depend on , since this parameter
does not have any inuence of the utility of the elite given that they do not ght in wars.
Let dene  as threshold value of  that solves the following equation
~p () = p () . (30)
20Program (29) corresponds to the maximization of a continuous function over a compact set and therefore,
by Weierstrass theorem, it has a solution provided that the constraint set is not empty. Moreover, it is easy
to verify that the constraint set can be non-empty for some admissible parameters combinations. For example,
as  tends to zero, the incentive-compatible redistribution also tends to zero, which clearly implies that the
constraint set of program (29) is not empty.
21This follows from the fact, in this case, the program of the elite consists in maximizing a linear function
over a non-empty compact set.
22Equivalently, ~p () can be dened as the value of the tax rate p such that (12) holds as equality when
when w = u = ^ . Also, p () can be dened as the value of the tax rate p such that, for every i 2 ,
condition (28) holds as equality, when w = u = ^ .
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In words,  is the value of  such that the maximum intertemporal taxation that the elite
can credibly commit to implement in state p when  = ,23 and expressed by the vector
[^ ; ^ ; p ()], is just su¢ cient to satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint (6) of the citi-
zens. It can be shown that equation (30) has only one solution , and that ~p () 7 p ()
for any  7  and vice versa.
Lemma 3 9  =  2 (0; 1] such that program (29) has a solution if and only if   .
Moreover,  >  if and only if  > .
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 provides a result similar to Lemma 2, since it tells us that strategy R is feasible
only if the cost of a deviation for the elite, expressed by , is su¢ ciently large (i.e. above the
threshold ). Moreover, according to Lemma 3, whether the threshold  is larger or smaller
than  depends on the individual e¤ort cost . In particular, if  < , then  < , which
implies that whenever democracy can be credibly promised by the elite, then an intertemporal
incentive-compatible redistribution can also be promised by the elite to the citizens. This
means that the concession of democracy does not increase the ability of the elite to commit to
future redistribution. The opposite is true if  > , which implies that  > . In this case,
when  2 (; ) the elite can make the credible promise to concede democracy after a war,
but cannot credibly promise an incentive-compatible redistribution. Hence, when  2 (; )
the concession of democracy is not only convenient to the elite, but it is also the only strategy
that allows them to avoid losing wars.
3.4 Characterization of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We can now describe the SPE of the political game that is best for the elite. However, we
rst remind that ,  and  are dened respectively as in (30), (24) and Lemma 3. In
strategy R, the tax rates  i, for all i 2 fw; u; pg, are dened as the tax rates that are the
solution to program (29). Moreover, let ~ht 1 and h^t 1 denote respectively the equilibrium
aggregate histories induced by strategy R and D, and let ht 1 denote the aggregate history
induced by the scal policy implemented by democracy in the subgames beginning in state D.
The following proposition o¤ers a complete characterization of the SPE.24
23We remind that  is dened in Lemma 1.
24Proposition 2 does not specify the governments strategy after any history where some deviation by the
citizens has occurred. As explained before, this is because of the assumption that citizens make their war e¤ort
decision competitively and because of the assumption that state C is absorbing.
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Proposition 2 The SPE of the dynamic political game that is best for the elite has the fol-
lowing form.
1. If st = N and  < , then
1a. If  < , the oligarchy chooses the strategy NA, setting N  t; ht 1 = 0,

 
t; h
t 1 = 0 and   t; ht 1 = 0 for any t 2 , and for any ht 1 2 Ht 1.
Moreover, citizen j chooses ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 0 if t = 
w, for any ht 1 2 Ht 1
and any zj;t i 2 f0; 1g. Thus, sT = s1 = C.
1b. If   , the oligarchy chooses strategy R, setting N  t; ht 1 =  i,   t; ht 1 =
0 and  
 
t; h
t 1 = 0 if t = i 2  and ht 1 = ~ht 1; and N  t; ht 1 = 0,

 
t; h
t 1 = 0 and   t; ht 1 = 0 if t = i 2  and ht 1 6= ~ht 1. Moreover,
citizen j chooses ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 1 if t = 
w, ht 1 = ~ht 1 and zj;t i = 0;
and ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 0 if t = 
w, and ht 1 6= ~ht 1 or zj;t i = 1. This implies
that the long run political regime is s1 = N .
2. If st = N and   , then
2a. If  < , the oligarchy chooses the strategy NA and the equilibrium is the same as
in case 1a.
2b. If    < , the oligarchy chooses strategy D, setting N  t; ht 1 = 0,

 
w; ht 1

= 1 and  
 
u; ht 1

= 1 for any t 2  and ht 1 = h^t 1; and
N
 
t; h
t 1 = 0,   t; ht 1 = 0 and   t; ht 1 = 0 if t = i 2  and
ht 1 6= h^t 1. Moreover, citizen j chooses ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 1 if t = 
w and
ht 1 = h^t 1; and ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 0 if t = 
w, and ht 1 6= h^t 1 or zj;t i = 1.
This implies that sT+1 = D, i.e. a transition to state D occurs at time T + 1.
2c. If   , the oligarchy chooses the strategy R and the equilibrium is the same as
in case 1b.
3. If st = D, then democracy sets D
 
t; h
t 1 = ^ , for any t 2  and ht 1 = ht 1;
and ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 1 if t = 
w and ht 1 = ht 1, while ej;t
 
t; h
t 1; zj;t i

= 0
if t = 
w and ht 1 6= ht 1 or zj;t = 1. This implies that s1 = D, i.e. democracy is
endogenously absorbing.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 2 claries the form of the SPE of the game, and how it depends on some key
parameters of the model: the individual e¤ort cost, , and the aggregate loss caused by a
military defeat, . When the military e¤ort cost of the citizens is small enough, i.e. when  is
below some threshold value  (Case 1a and 1b), the elite choose either no action if  is small
enough (Case 1a) or, vice versa, to promise a credible incentive-compatible redistribution to the
citizens (Case 1b).25 The rst result (Case 1a) comes from the fact that when the disruption
generated by a war loss is relatively small ( is below some threshold), the threat posed by
war to the elite is smaller then the cost of preventing a military defeat. Hence, the elite nd
optimal choosing no action. When instead  is su¢ ciently small (Case 1b), a deviation from
strategy R is relatively unprotable for the elite (recall that the incentive-compatible taxation
is decreasing in ). This implies that the elite can credibly commit to an incentive-compatible
redistribution whenever it can credibly commit to concede democracy (i.e.  < ). Because
the elite can commit toR for a larger set of parameters than they can commit to D, and because
R gives the elite a higher value than D (since democracy always taxes at maximum possible
rate ^ , i.e. the preferred tax of the citizens), democracy is never conceded in equilibrium, and
the political state remains always equal to N .
When instead  is relatively large (i.e.,   ), then democracy may be conceded by
the elite in equilibrium when  assumes intermediate values (Case 2b). This is because the
incentive-compatible redistribution that needs to be promised to the citizens to induce them
to put e¤ort, is now su¢ ciently high that  > , i.e. strategy R is feasible for a smaller
set of parameters than D is. In particular, when  is in between  and , the strategy
R is not feasible for the elite, which prefer, by Lemma 1, to make the credible promise to
concede democracy at the end of the war rather than facing a transition to state C. Finally,
as before, when the war threat is very small (Case 2a) the optimal strategy of the elite is to
choose strategy NA, and when it is very high (Case 2c), the strategy R which is both optimal
and feasible for the elite.
It must be emphasized that the presence of a variable degree of external threat in peri-
ods of peace, is crucial to explain the di¤erence between the mere provision of some income
redistribution in the favor of the citizens, and the concession of democracy. If all periods of
peace were alike, i.e. the probability of transition to a state a war was always the same, then
democracy would not serve the purpose of providing an additional commitment device to the
elite. This is because if the promise of the elite to concede democracy after a war is credible, so
is the promise to implement at anytime in the future the same redistribution that democracy
25We remind for convenience that the threshold  is independent of .
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implements (i.e. the maximum feasible redistribution). If instead not all periods of peace are
alike as we assume, and some are more peaceful then others, than conceding democracy
in the period of unstable peace following a war, allows the elite to commit to redistributing
income also in the future periods of stable peace, when the incentive for the elite to break a
promise of redistribution is stronger.
4 Some Historical Evidence
In the modern era, mass-armies rst appeared in France in 1793, when the National Convention
decreed the famous levée en masse, in response to the continuous worsening of the military
situation in the war begun the previous year against an anti-revolutionary coalition formed
by several European powers.26 The new military model adopted by France proved to be so
successful that mass-armies were quickly adopted by a number of other European countries
during the Napoleonic Wars. The adoption of mass-armies had indeed signicant consequences,
including of stimulating a number of important reforms (discussed in detail below) in those
European countries, such as Prussia/Germany, which had made a permanent transition to the
new form of military organization. Interestingly, the Prussian autocracy was able to form a
highly e¤ective mass-army by making primarily social and economic concessions to the citizens,
but only marginal political reforms.
However, after the end of the Napoleonic wars, several other European countries (including
France itself)27 decided to rely once again on a professional army, of relatively small size and
formed by volunteers or mercenaries rather than by conscripts. As a result, the military innova-
tions rst introduced by revolutionary France had, overall, only limited political consequences
in Europe through the 19th century.28
Indeed, at the beginning of the 20th century, the process of democratization of Europe was
in many respects very far from being completed. For instance, the fraction of the population
enfranchised in most European countries before World War I was generally smaller than one
26 Interestingly, the proclamation of the levée en masse came along with that of a new constitution, the so-
called Montagnard Constitution, prescribing universal su¤rage as opposed to the limited franchise contemplated
by the previous constitution of 1791. This new constitution never became e¤ective however.
27France adopted once again universal conscription only in 1875, in consequence of the defeat su¤ered during
the Franco-Prussian War, which clearly revealed the superiority of mass-armies over professional militaries. The
return to the model of mass-army took place in concomitance with a transition to democracy occurred with the
proclamation of the constitution of the Third Republic in 1875.
28The reversion to professional militaries after the Napoleonic Wars was of course related to the relatively
peaceful international climate promoted by the creation of the Concert of Europeat the Congress of Vienna,
which persisted with few limited interruptions (e.g. the War of Crimea and the Franco-Prussian War) until of
the outbreak of World War I.
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fourth, and did not include women.29 Moreover, the political voice of the lower classes was
subject to substantial restrictions of various nature, even where the right to vote was formally
conceded to a relatively large part of the society. In this respect, Halperin (2004 p. 131)
writes that Where the su¤rage included members of the poorer classes, three-class and other
weighted and plural voting systems, as well as open balloting and restrictions on and biases
against working-class organizations and parties, made it futile for poor people to vote.30
Other electoral techniques used to limit the power of the masses were the practice of declaring
arbitrarily void an election whose results went against the incumbent government, and the
requirement to pay a minimum direct tax in order to vote.31 As a result, according to Halperin,
In nearly all states in Europe, the franchise remained highly restricted until after World War
II. On the eve of World War I, Norway was the only country in Europe with universal and
equal su¤rage. It was only after World War II that universal, equal, direct, and secret su¤rage
became the norm throughout Western Europe.
The waging of two total wars in the 20th century required indeed the mobilization of both
soldiers and civilians to an extent hardly ever observed before in the course of history. For
instance, between 1914 and 1918 the U.K. mobilized as many as 6.2 million men, corresponding
to 13% of its total population, while Germany and France drafted roughly 20% of their pop-
ulation, namely 13.25 and 8.2 million men respectively. The corresponding gures relative to
World War II are even more impressive. Several authors have suggested, consistently with our
theory, that the mass warfare peculiar of the rst part of 20th century, has been a driving force
of the process of transition of the Western world toward the adoption of universal franchise
and the establishment of stable democracy. For example, Mann (1988 p. 158) writes in this
respect that But also, the experience of the middle class before the war progress through
the nation now became more generalized to the people as a whole. The people sacriced but
not for nothing. A bargain was struck, fairly explicitly, at the end of the war there would
be extension of the franchise (probably including women) and welfare reforms. Along the
same lines, Porter (1994 p. 150) writes that, As the only full-scale wars ever fought among
industrialized powers, the First and Second World Wars produced permanent changes in the
29For example, the percentage of the population enfranchised in 1910 was 22 in Germany, Belgium, Switzer-
land, 21 in Austria, 19 in Sweden, 18 in the U.K., 17 in Denmark, 14 in the Netherlands and 8 in Italy. In a
few countries the enfranchised share of the population war larger by the same year (45 percent in Finland, 33
in Norway and 29 in France).
30Open balloting consists in voting openly, i.e. declaring the vote in public. This procedure allowed the
local elite to easily threaten of punishment whoever voted badly.Weighted voting systems attached more
importance to the vote of the wealthy and/or educated people.
31Goldstein (1951 ch. 1) presents an extensive discussion of how voting procedures and electoral laws sub-
stantially violated the one-man-one-vote principle in 19th century Europe.
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internal organization and structure of virtually all European states.The same author adds
that the modern state born from the two World Wars had a structure articulated in a mass
state, in which the political voice of the people was nally separated from their socioeconomic
status as well as a welfare state, taking care of the well-being of its citizens. And everywhere
in Europe the working class movement requested political participation in exchange of war
participation. As explained by Andreski (1968 p. 27), The passive resistance of the masses
is most dangerous to the ruling group when the state is ghting for survival. At such times,
if the willing cooperation of the masses is militarily essential, an e¤ort must be made to win
them over, to convince them that they are ghting for themselves.Finally, Hobsbawm (1990)
remarks that it was widely accepted by the national elite that the First World War could not
have been won without the support of the masses and that all governments tried to present the
conict primarily as a threat to the interests of the latter as well as the occasion for a social
transformation of the country in their favor.32
In the following subsections, we discuss at greater length the causal nexus between warfare
and the extension of political and social rights identied by our theory in Germany, England
and the United States. These countries were chosen since they provide a clear illustration of
the two possible diverging patterns of political development contemplated by our model: one
involving the concessions of social reforms only, and the other involving the transition to con-
solidated democracy. We then also briey discuss the examples of some non-Western countries
(essentially those in Latin America and Africa), which experienced neither the creation of a
welfare state, nor a transition to democracy, in relation to their virtual insulation from mass
warfare over the last century.
4.1 The Case of Prussia/Germany
A sequence of major social and institutional reforms was undertaken by the Prussian govern-
ment in the aftermath of the military defeat inicted by Napoleon to the Prussian army at
the battle of Jena (1806), which was arguably instrumental in creating both the awareness of
the need, and a wide political support for a substantial transformation of the status quo. One
of the rst major socioeconomic reforms undertaken by the Prussian leaders was the abolition
of serfdom (1807), aimed at the creation of a class of small land owners. Another important
administrative reform involved the creation of a representative organ at the municipal level,
based on a relatively large su¤rage. At the same time, a number of military reforms radically
32Dolman (2004 p. 27) presents quantitative evidence relative to Western countries over the period 1860-
1992, suggesting that a sizable extension of franchise follows each signicant rise of incorporation of civilians
into military service.
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transformed the Prussian army into an organization based on conscription similar to the Grand
Armée. The law of September 3, 1814, required all Prussians subjects to serve ve years in
the standing army (three on active service and two in the reserve) and fourteen years in the
militia, or Landwehr.
Andreski (1968 p. 69) explicitly links with the advent of mass-armies and the age of the
reform in Prussia, writing that The advent of mass-armies produced a new situation. The
loyalty of the lower classes had to be strenghtened by extending to them various rights. In
Prussia, and later in Germany, this policy was perhaps most deliberate. Serfdom was abolished
concurrently with the military reforms of Stein, and peasants were granted the free ownership
of the land they cultivated. Skocpol (1979 p. 108) also emphasizes the military rationale
behind the abolition of serfdom, as she writes that Serfs were given their personal freedom.
And universal military conscription was begun, a measure that allowed the Prussian armies
to expand suddenly and to benet from the increased enthusiasm of citizens newly beneted
by the reforms or aroused to hostility by several years of French intervention and nancial
exactions.33
A major reason for the eagerness of the Prussian government to undertake many radical
reforms (and for the relative lack of opposition to them by the Junkers) was the exceptional
external military challenge that Prussia (and later Germany) constantly faced due to the
geographic position (located at the center of Europe and between the East and the West) and
conguration (shaped by the lack of natural boundaries protecting the national territory from
invasion by foreign armies). This point is clearly emphasized by Huntington (1957 p. 33) who
writes that: Lacking natural boundaries, and with her territories scattered all over Germany,
Prussia was uniquely dependent upon strong military force to maintain her independence and
integrity. The rulers of Prussia had been aware of this since the middle of the seventeenth
century and had poured tremendous resources and manpower into the maintenance of an
e¢ cient standing army throughout the eighteenth century.
According to our model, it is precisely the exceptionally serious external threat  cor-
responding in our model to a value of  above the critical threshold  faced by Prussia
and later by Germany, that explains why its government could mobilize the masses by grant-
ing them social reforms only, rather than by conceding democracy. Indeed, signicant social
33 Interestingly, the major defeat su¤ered in the Crimean War (1853-56), triggered a somewhat similar path of
social and military reforms also in Russia. In particular, in 1861 Alexander II issued his Emancipation Manifesto
that proposed 17 legislative acts that would free tens of millions of serfs. The czar announced that personal
serfdom would be abolished and all peasants would be able to buy land from their landlords. At the same time,
the military was transformed from a professional force into an army recruited with mass conscription.
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reforms continued to be granted later on under the leadership of Bismarck. For instance, com-
pulsory sickness insurance was introduced in 1883, an accident insurance in 1884 and 1885 and
a pension system providing assistance to the aged and to the disabled in 1889. As a result,
by the end of the 19th century, Germany had established the most comprehensive system of
social insurance and of work protection in the world.
Yet, despite having an impressively advanced social legislation, the Second Reich never
evolved in a true constitutional monarchy based on the principle of popular sovereignty and
democratic representation. Universal su¤rage had indeed been formally introduced in Germany
as early as in 1871 (the year of birth of the new nation). However, the real political power
belonged to the Bundesrat, which was controlled by Prussia; in turn Prussia was ruled, through
a three-tiered voting system, by its economic elite, which included both industrialists and the
Junkers. As a result, Germany remained de facto an autocracy until the end of World War I.
A major impulse toward the creation of an e¤ective democracy in Germany, was indeed
provided by the endurance of the First World War. Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg warned
at some point the Prussian war cabinet that the continuation of war required an electoral
reform. In January of 1916 and later in his Easter Degree of 1917, the Kaiser indeed promised
the concession of a truly equal su¤rage at the end of the war, through the abolition of the
three-tiered electoral system, and a reform of the upper chamber of the Parliament, (Porter
1994 p. 173, Dolman 2004 p. 148).34 Moreover, a special committee was immediately created
to examine the question of a post-war constitutional reform.
Democracy was nally introduced in Germany in 1919, following its defeat in the Great
War. It is undeniable that a serious revolution threat existed in Germany at that time, greatly
fuelled by the crushing military defeat su¤ered by the country, and that this threat is likely to
have played an important role in the creation of a parliamentary democracy (e.g. Therborn,
1977). Nonetheless, the evidence discussed above suggests that, had Germany won the war,
the introduction of democracy, as the fulllment of the wartime promises made by the Kaiser,
may perhaps have been as well on agenda.
4.2 The Cases of Britain and of the U.S.
Unlike Germany, Great Britain and the U.S. represent examples of countries where the involve-
ment in mass warfare has lead to a progressive extension of franchise (albeit at a somewhat
di¤erent pace), culminated in universal su¤rage.
34In order to maintain the war spirit of the nation, the Kaisers military government issued public promises
that if the army could prevail, future military and political reforms would be forthcoming, but the crisis was
not the time for change.(Dolman 2004 p. 148).
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Britain was at the lead of the process of democratization of the West during the 19th century,
as franchise was extended there for three times (1832, 1867 and 1884). During this period, no
major war comparable to the Napoleonic Wars was fought in Europe, and the factors that have
played a key role in the progressive democratization of England can be found in the threat of
the explosion of a social revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000) and in the existence of
an intra-elite conict (Lizzeri and Persico 2004, Llavador and Oxoby, 2005). Nevertheless, as
explained before, at the end of the 19th century the democratization of Britain was far from
being complete. The total wars of the 20th century, which Britain fought with conscript armies
(with the exception of the rst part of World War I), transformed dramatically the British
society and its government. Near the end of the First World War, the British Parliament
passed the Representation of the People Act, extending franchise to all adult males and many
females. The number of qualied voters raised from 8 to 21 million, corresponding to three
quarters of the adult population: for the rst time in history, the House of Commons would
have been elected by a majority of British citizens. Moreover, the system of plural voting lost
much importance after 1918, and it was formally abolished in 1948, three years after the end
of the Second World War (see Therborn 1977 p. 8).
Our model suggests that the smooth transition of Britain to full democracy may have
originated from the fact that its involvement in the two world wars, was somehow limited due
to geographic factors. In particular, the insular nature of Britain arguably made a potential
military defeat appear less costly (i.e. let the parameter  be in the intermediate region dened
by two thresholds  and ), and therefore required the concessions of democracy as opposed
to redistribution only. This is consistent with the explanation for the introduction of universal
su¤rage in Britain provided by Giddens (1987 p. 234), who writes that As soon as the
unication of Germany occurred Bismarck established universal male su¤rage, as a response
to what he saw as the military exigencies of the new state. In countries lacking a proximate
revolutionary background and not so directly involved in European war, most notably Britain,
the extension of franchise tended to be halting. Only with the experience of the First World
War, in which conscription was not introduced until the armed forces had su¤ered huge losses,
was universal male su¤rage instituted. Once more, this was done in explicit recognition of the
ties between citizenship rights and military obligations.
Many historians have also emphasized the causal link existing between the involvement of
the U.S. in major wars, and their progressive transition to democracy. For example, in his ac-
count of the history of franchise in the U.S., Keyssar (2000) argues that the process of expansion
and retrenchment of the right to vote in America reects the dynamic conict between class
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tensions, pushing to its restriction, and the exigencies of war, fostering its di¤usion. Keyssar
(p. xxi) writes that ...Nearly all of the major expansions of the franchise that have occurred
in American history took place either during or in the wake of wars. The historical record
indicates that this was not a coincidence: the demand of both war itself and preparedness for
war created powerful pressures to enlarge the right to vote. Armies had to be recruited, often
from so-called lower orders of society, an it was rhetorically as well as practically di¢ cult to
compel men to bear arms while denying them the franchise.35
Some of the most important steps of the process of democratization of the U.S. that high-
light the connection between participation to the war e¤ort and the extension of political right
suggested by our theory, include the introduction of universal male su¤rage, essentially to the
benet of ethnic minorities such as African Americans (1869), the extension of the right to
vote to women (1920) and the decision of the Supreme Court to declare the white primary
unconstitutional (1944).
The Fifteenth Amendment extended the voting right to African American males in 1869.
The Republicans, who controlled most state legislatures, argued that black men had earned the
right to vote because of the heroism they demonstrated as soldiers in the Civil War. Indeed,
African American supported with loyalty the cause of the Union, fought with dedication and
died to preserve it.36 Su¤rage was extended to women by the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
The amendment was also actively supported as a war measure by President Wilson in an
extraordinary address in January 1918. In another address to the Senate in September 1918,
Wilson returned again on the link between franchise and the war e¤ort of women, arguing that
this was essential for the prosecution of the conict.37 The Su¤ragists themselves stressed the
importance of wartime role of women, and even threaten to diminish their e¤ort if su¤rage were
not forthcoming. In 1944, the Supreme Count declared in Smith v. Allwright, that the white
primary, one of the most e¤ective methods to actually deny the vote to African American,
35Keyssar (p. 36) also identies the reason behind the willingness of the middle-upper classes to extend
franchise as he writes: Why did voting members of the community sometimes elect to share their political
power with others? In numerous cases, it was because they saw themselves as having a direct interest in
enlarging the electorate. One such interest was military preparedness and the defense of the republic. In the
wake of the Revolutionary War and again after the War of 1812, many middle-class citizens concluded that
extending the franchise to the lower orderswould enhance their own security and help to preserve their way
of life, by assuring that such men would continue to serve in the army and the militia.
36The importance of the war e¤ort of the African American, as well as its political signicance, were explicitly
recognized also by military leaders. For instance, General William Sherman (quoted in Keyssar 2000 p. 88)
declared that: when the ght is over, the hand that drops the musket cannot be denied the ballot.
37Wilson (quoted in Keyssar 2000 p. 216) declared that womens su¤rage was essential to the successful
prosecution of the great war of humanity in which are engaged... We have made partners of the women in this
war. Shall we admit them only to a partnership of sacrice and su¤ering and toll and not to a partnership of
privilege and of right? This war could not have been fought... if it had not been for the services of women.
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was unconstitutional. While this was a judicial, rather than a political, decision, the judges
themselves were arguably not at all indi¤erent to the exigencies of war. Indeed, an important
commentator of the New York Times, the Supreme Court reporter Arthur Krock, argued
that the Courts decision in the Smith v. Allwright case was strongly related to exceptional
circumstances of the war.38
Similarly to Britain, geographic factors (and the related limited expected cost of a military
defeat) arguably explain why the involvement of the U.S. in mass warfare, did lead to the
concessions of democracy rather than of income redistribution alone.
4.3 No War, No Democracy? Africa and Latin America
The cases of Africa and Latin America provide additional interesting evidence on the relation
between warfare and political and social change. It is been widely argued (e.g. Herbst, 2000,
Centeno 2002) that the relative insulation from major wars during the 20th century has been a
crucial determinant of the distinctive path of political and institutional evolution experienced
by many African and Latin American countries.39
In particular, Centeno (2002) argues that the Latin American states system has always been
remarkably peaceful during all of the 20th century, due to the lack of incentives for nations to
wage war against each other. In turn, the remarkable rarity of major international conicts,
partly explains the slow transition to democracy of Latin American states, whose elite were
not compelled to make political concessions by the need of mobilizing the masses in order to
sustain the war e¤ort.40 Therborn (1977) also suggests the existence of a similar causal relation
between the insulation of Latin American states from the two world wars, and the fragility of
their democratic institutions.
Perhaps even more importantly, the nature of the wars fought in Europe during the 20th
century has been strikingly di¤erent from the nature of the wars occasionally fought in Africa
and Latin America over the same period of time. European wars have been total wars while
38Krock (quoted in Keyssar 2000 p. 248) wrote that the real reason for the... [decision was] that the common
sacrices of wartime have turned public opinion and the court against previously sustained devices to exclude
minorities from any privilege of citizenship.
39Latin America experienced a signicant period of international military rivalry and warfare in the aftermath
of the Decolonization process, occurred in the rst decades of the 19th century. However, this military rivalry was
short-lived and virtually vanished by the beginning of the 20th century. Vice versa, Africa did not essentially
experienced Decolonization until the post-World War II period, and was relatively peaceful thereafter. See
Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002) for more on this point.
40Centeno (2002 pp. 30-31) claims that: The Latin American states were never strong enough to demand
full conscription. Perhaps more important, there was never a perceived need for the kind of social upheaval
implied by mass armies. The state did not need the population, as soldiers or even as future workers, and thus
could a¤ord to exclude it.
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African and Latin American wars have been limited conicts, causing a substantially lower
disruption of income and wealth (Centeno, 2002). The degree of disruptiveness of a conict is
captured in our model by the parameter : a total war is associated with a relatively high value
of , and a limited war with a relatively low value of . Our model predicts that countries
exposed to limited wars (i.e. which lead the disruption of a proportion of income lower than
the threshold ) should be expected to experience neither democratic transitions, nor welfare
state expansions. This prediction appears indeed consistent with the historical experience of
both Africa and Latin America over the last century.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have o¤ered a theory of political transitions which focuses on the interaction
between international conicts and the domestic conict of interest over scal policy between
upper and lower classes. We have argued that democracy and redistributive policies represent
concessions that the elite may choose to make to the citizens in order to increase their will-
ingness to put e¤ort in ghting in mass-armies. The resulting higher martial e¤ectiveness of
the army can more than compensate the elite for the redistribution of income and for the loss
of political power, by making a military defeat (and the consequent aggregate income loss)
more unlikely to occur. Moreover, we have shown that democracy is conceded by the elite as a
commitment device to future income redistribution when a mere promise of it is not credible.
Our theory o¤ers a novel explanation for why many episodes of democratic transitions
through the 19th and especially the 20th century have occurred in the aftermath of major wars.
We can explain why democracy is relatively unlikely to emerge and to consolidate in presence
of a very serious as well as limited or absent external threat. In fact, in the rst case, the
elite can make credible promises of income redistribution to induce the citizens to put high
e¤ort in ghting wars, while in the latter case the elite are not compelled to make any kind of
concession at all.
Our theory is also broadly consistent with the empirical evidence recently provided by
Reiter and Stam (2002) which demonstrate that democratic soldiers are signicantly superior
in terms of military e¤ectiveness, as represented by leadership and initiative on the battleeld,
after controlling for factors such as the level of economic development. Reiter and Stam
interpret their ndings as evidence that democratic soldiers are indeed more motivated to
ght, and do so better, than soldiers serving in the armies of non-democratic states.41
41For instance, Reiter and Stam write (p. 61) that States must ask citizens to make individual sacrices,
whether to pay taxes, to sacrice their liberty by serving in the military, or to risk their lives on the battleeld.
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A number of important questions remain open for future research. For example, an inter-
esting extension of our model would be to make endogenous the probability of war by analyzing
the incentives of the states to engage in international wars. Also, it would be worth studying
the impact of warfare on other types of political institutions. Finally, it would be interesting
to provide a careful quantitative assessment of the impact of wars on democratization.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3
To determine if program (29) has a solution or not, we begin by determining what is the
maximum amount of intertemporal redistribution that the elite can credibly commit to provide
to the citizens when s = N . Clearly, this corresponds to the vector of taxes such that the three
no-deviations conditions of the elite in the three possible states of the world, expressed by
(28), all hold as equalities. This requirement leads to a system of three equations, that can be
written in compact form as
V H
 
N;i; [w; u; p]

= ~V H
 
N;i

; (31)
for any i 2 . We remind that, for given [w; u; p], the values V H  N;i; [w; u; p] are
provided by the solution of the recursions (25), (26) and (27), and the values ~V H
 
N;i

are ex-
pressed by (21), (22) and (23). It can be readily veried that the values V H
 
N;i; [w; u; p]

are linear in w, u, and p and therefore the system of equations expressed by (31) has at
the most one solution (given that the three corresponding equations are linearly independent),
which is expressed by the vector [w; u; p].
It is also straightforward to verify that  i is an increasing function of  for each i 2 fw; u; pg,
and such that  i () # 0 if  # 0. Using this fact, we can dene more formally the set of tax
vectors [w; u; p] that the elite can credibly promise to the citizens as
B ()  f[w; u; p] : w  w () ; u  u () ; p  p ()g ; (32)
where the notation used emphasizes that the set depends on the parameter . For future
reference, we observe here that the schedules  i () do not depend on , and therefore the
measure of set B () also does not depend on .
Soldiers are more likely to accept the dangers of the battleeld and place their lives at risk if they are serving
in a military overseen by a government grounded in democratic political institutions. They are more likely to
perceive the war e¤ort and the leadership itself as reecting their own interests if the need for popular consent
constraints the government and can be removed from o¢ ce if it fails to hold up its end of the social contract.
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The rest of the proof of is organized as follows. First, we characterize an important
monotonicity property of the set B () and of the solution of program (29) (Claims 1 and
2), which is used to prove the rst part of the lemma. Then, we provide a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for program (29) to have a solution at  =  (Claims 3 and 4) in terms of
a threshold value of . Finally, we use all the results obtained to prove the second part of the
lemma.
The set B () has the following important property,
Claim 1 The set B () dened in (32) is such that
B (1)  B (2) ; (33)
for each 1 and 2 such that 1  2.
Proof. It follows immediately from the increasing monotonicity of  i with respect to ,
for any i 2 fw; u; pg.
We also remark for future reference, that  i, and therefore the set B (), does not depend
on , since neither side of (31) depends on the e¤ort cost of the citizens.
Program (29) has a solution if the set B () has a non-empty intersections with the set E
of the triples [w; u; p] 2 [0; ^ ]3 such that condition (12) holds, i.e. if B () \ E 6= ?.
Now, let  denote the inmum of the set of values of  such that program (29) has a
solution, or
  inf f 2 (0; 1) : B () \ E 6= ?g : (34)
The following is an immediate consequence of Claim 1 and of a property of the set E.
Claim 2 Suppose that , as dened in (34), exists. Then, program (29) has a solution for
some  if and only if   .
Proof. Because the frontier of the set E does not depends on  (since neither side of (12)
depends on this parameter), the monotonicity property of B () reported in Claim 1 implies
that, if  exists, then B () \ E 6= ? for any  > . Also, by denition of , we have
that B () \ E = ? for any  < .
If , as dened in (34) does not exist, then the same reasoning as in the proof of Claim
2, implies that program (29) has no solution for any value of , and we conventionally set
 = 1. Note also that  > 0 since B (0) = ? (i.e. if wars cause no income loss the elite
cannot credibly promise any positive level of taxation). This proves the rst part of Lemma 3.
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To prove the second part of Lemma 3, let us consider in particular the set B (), where
 is dened implicitly by (24). We remind that, when  = , the promise made by the
elite in state w to concede democracy in state u is credible, i.e. in state u the elite prefer
to be taxed at the maximum possible level ^ in every state of the world (which according to
Proposition 1 is the scal policy chosen by democracy) rather then deviating and obtaining
the corresponding value ~V H (N;u) dened by (21). It follows that, if  = , the elite can
credibly commit in state w to set taxes in state u at the level ^ . Furthermore, because
~V H (N;u) > ~V H (N;w) (see the proof of Lemma 1), in state w the elite are also better-o¤
in an equilibrium where taxes are always set at the constant level ^ , then by deviating from
such equilibrium, and experiencing a sudden military defeat. We then have that the solution
of (31) is such that u () = w () = ^ ; and p () is determined as the solution of equation
V H (N;p; [w; u; p]) = ~V H (N;p) , (35)
imposing that u = w = ^ , and the set B () has the following form
B ()  f[w; u; p] : w  ^ ; u  ^ ; p  p ()g : (36)
In particular, it can be demonstrated that p () < ^ . To prove this, recall that in the proof
of Lemma 1 it has been demonstrated that for any , ~V H (N;p) > ~V H (N;u), and that, by
denition of , ~V H (N;u j =  ) = V H (D). Combining these results, using the fact that
V H (D) = V H (N;p; [^ ; ^ ; ^ ]), and equation (35), we obtain that
V H (N;p; [^ ; ^ ; p ()]) > V H (N;p; [^ ; ^ ; ^ ]) :
which clearly implies that p () < ^ .
Program (29) has a solution at  =  if the maximum amount of intertemporal redistrib-
ution that the elite can promise, i.e. corresponding to the taxes vector [^ ; ^ ; p ()], satises
the incentive-compatibility constraint of the citizens-soldiers (12).
To determine if this is the case or not, dene ~p as the level of p such that (12) holds as
equality with st = N for all t, and Tt =  tY , and w = u = ^ . The corresponding vector
of taxes [^ ; ^ ; ~p] is incentive-compatible for the citizens by construction, and can be directly
compared with the vector [^ ; ^ ; p ()] dened above.
In particular, by the analysis made above, if p ()  ~p, or equivalently if [^ ; ^ ; ~p] 2
B (), then program (29) has a solution when  = . Moreover if p () < ~p, or equivalently
if [^ ; ^ ; ~p] =2 B (), then the maximum amount of redistribution the elite can credibly promise
to the citizens is not su¢ cient to induce them to put e¤ort in war periods. This leads to the
following Claim.
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Claim 3 When  = , program (29) has a solution if and only if [^ ; ^ ; ~p] 2 B ().
It can be demonstrated that [^ ; ^ ; ~p] 2 B () if the value of the individual e¤ort cost
parameter  is su¢ ciently small.
Claim 4 [^ ; ^ ; ~p] 2 B () if and only if   , where  is the unique solution of equation
(30).
Proof. Denote ~p = ~p () as the function obtained by letting the tax rate ~p dened above
vary with . Solving the system of recursions (7), (8) and (9) by assuming that w = u = ^ ,
and that the incentive-compatibility constraint (12) holds as equality when the political state
is permanently s = N , i.e. that

h
V L (N;u)  V^ L (N;u)
i
= ,
it can be veried that
~p () = c0 + c1; (37)
where c0 and c1 are constants depending on a list of parameters of the model, but not on ,
with c0 < 0 and c1 > 0.
Because ~p () is a continuous and strictly increasing function of  (since the constant c1
dened above is strictly positive), and such that ~p () # c0 < 0 as  # 0 and ~p () " 1 as
 " 1, 9!  2 R+ such that ~p () =  for any   0. Also, because, as remarked previously,
both the schedule p () and the threshold  do not depend on , the properties of the schedule
~p () imply that 9  =  such that ~p ()  p () for any    and ~p () > p () for
any  > .42 It immediately follows from these results that [^ ; ^ ; ~p ()] 2 B () if, and only
if,   , which proves the claim.
Observing that the threshold  does not depend on  (since neither ~p () nor p ()
depend on ), and combining Claims 3 and 4, we obtain that program (29) has a solution at
 =  if   , and that, vice versa, program (29) has no solution at  =  if  > .
Furthermore, by Claim 2, if program (29) has a solution at  = , i.e. if   , then
  , where  is dened by (34). Conversely, if program (29) has no solution at  = ,
i.e. if  > , then  < . This proves the second part of Lemma 3.
42Note also that, because p () < ^ , we also have that ~p () < ^ . This implies that ~p () is a feasible
tax rate, i.e. it does not violate the constraint that   ^ .
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by characterizing some preliminary results regarding the preferences of the elite over
alternative pairs of strategies.
Claim 5 Strategy NA is adopted by the elite if and only if   min f,g.
Proof. When strategy R is feasible, the no-deviation condition from it of the elite is
satised in any state including state  = w; moreover, the value that the elite get from a
deviation in the state w, (19), is equal to the value that they get from NA, (14). This implies,
when R is feasible, the value of R for the elite is always greater than the value of NA: By
Lemma 1, when D is feasible, the value of D for the elite is always greater than the value of
NA. Also, combining Lemmas 1 and 3, we have that either strategy R or strategy D is feasible
if, and only if,   min f,g.
Claim 5 implies that over the range   min f,g, where either R or D are feasible,
strategy NA can be neglected. The next Claim characterizes the preferences of the elite when
both D and R are feasible.
Claim 6 If both strategy D and the strategy R are feasible, i.e. if   max f; g, then the
elite always prefer strategy R over any other strategy.
Proof. Strategy NA can of course be neglected. Both strategies D and R allow to win
wars, but strategy D is less convenient for the elite since it involves always setting taxes at the
maximum level ^ preferred by the citizens, rather than at incentive-compatible level preferred
by the elite.
We can now use these preliminary results to prove Proposition 2.
The proof of Case 1a and Case 2a in Proposition 2 follows immediately from Claim 5.
When  < min f,g, the elite choose no-action, and the best-response of the citizens is to
put no e¤ort in ghting. Hence, a transition to state C occurs at time t = T + 1.
The proof of Case 1b in Proposition 2 follows from Claim 5, which implies that strategy
NA is never chosen over the range   . Also, when  < , we have that  < 
(by Lemma 3) which implies (by Claim 6) that strategy D is also never chosen by the elite
for any   . It follows that the elite choose in equilibrium strategy R for any   .
Moreover, because citizens are credibly promised an incentive-compatible redistribution, they
always choose to put e¤ort, which implies that st = N for any t  0. Finally, if a deviation
from the equilibrium history in question, ~ht 1, occurs, the citizens choose to put no e¤ort in
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war again, and the elite always set  = 0, which causes a transition to state C in the period
after a new war occurs. The proof of Case 2c is analogous.
The proof of Case 2b in Proposition 2, follows from Claim 5, which implies the elite do no
choose strategy NA for any   max f; g and from Lemma 3, which implies that, when
 > ,  <  and the elite choose strategy D rather then strategyR over the range (; )
since the latter is not feasible. Moreover, because citizens are credibly promised democracy at
period T , they always choose to put e¤ort, which implies that sT+1 = D. If a deviation from
the equilibrium history in question, h^t 1, occurs, the citizens choose to put no e¤ort in war
again, the elite respond by setting always set  = 0, which causes a transition to states C in
the period after a new war occurs.
Finally, the proof of Case 3 in Proposition 2 follows immediately from description of the
equilibrium of the subgame beginning in state (D;u) provided by Proposition 1, which implies
that st = D for any t > T + 1.
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